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What is 'Complex Government' and what can we do about it?  
'Complex government' relates to many factors: the size and multi-level nature of government; 
the proliferation of rules, regulations and public bodies; a crowded arena with blurry 
boundaries between policymakers and the actors who influence them; and, general 
uncertainty when people interact in unpredictable ways within a changeable policy 
environment.  Complex government is difficult to understand, control, influence and hold to 
account. This article considers it from various perspectives: scholars trying to conceptualise 
it; policymakers trying to control or adapt to it; and, scientists, interest groups and individuals 
trying to influence it. 
Complex Government as a concept 
For scholars, a key aim is to distinguish between the intuitive meaning of complex 
government, as big, complicated and difficult to understand, and the specific meaning of 
complex system. Policy theory breaks down the intuitive idea into five key elements: actors, 
institutions, networks, ideas, and context. The task is to make a complex process simple 
enough to understand, by focusing on or more elements.  
When we focus on actors, we examine who they are and how they act. Actors can be 
individuals or collectives, including private companies, interest groups and governments 
bodies (Weible, 2014). The literature explores a shift from an early post-war period 
characterised by centralized and exclusive policymaking towards a fragmented multi-level 
system with a much larger number of actors. This development could change the meaning of 
‘policymaking’, from an association with central government action towards a wider 
policymaking system containing more key players.  
Things get complicated further when we compare ‘rational’ action with other explanations for 
behaviour. Most theories identify ‘bounded rationality’: people do not have the time, 
resources and cognitive ability to consider all information, possibilities, solutions, or 
consequences of their actions. They use informational shortcuts or heuristics to produce 
good-enough decisions (Simon, 1976: xxviii). Actors may be ‘goal-oriented’, but also use 
emotional, intuitive and often unreliable heuristics associated with ‘fast’ thinking 
(Kahneman, 2012). For example, policymaker attention may lurch dramatically from one 
issue to another, ‘advocacy coalitions’ may ‘demonize’ their opponents, and policymakers 
may draw on quick, emotional judgements to treat different social groups as deserving of 
government benefits or sanctions (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Jenkins-
Smith et al, 2014; Schneider et al, 2014).  
When we examine ‘institutions’, we want to know the rules, norms, and practices that 
influence behaviour.  Some are visible and widely understood – such as constitutions which 
shape other institutional activity, by establishing the venues where decisions are made, and 
the rules that allow actors to enter the policy process (Ostrom et al 2014). Or, institutions are 
informal rules, often only understood in particular organisations. This wide definition allows 
us to compare formal understandings of how people should act, with informal ‘rules of the 
game’. Crucially, different rules develop in many parts of government, often with little 
reference to each other. This can produce: unpredictable outcomes when people follow 
different (often contradictory) rules when they interact; a multiplicity of accountability and 
performance management processes which do not join up;  ‘international regime complexity’ 
when agreements, obligations and bilateral deals overlap (Alter and Meunier, 2009); or, a 
convoluted statute book, made more complex by the interaction between laws and regulations 
designed for devolved, UK and EU matters (Cabinet Office and Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel, 2013).  
When we identify policy networks (‘subsystems’), we begin with the huge reach and 
responsibilities of governments, producing the potential for ministerial ‘overload’. 
Governments divide responsibilities into broad sectors and specialist subsectors, and senior 
policymakers delegate responsibility to civil servants. ‘Policy community’ describes the 
relationships that develop between the actors responsible for policy decisions and the 
‘pressure participants’, such as interest groups, with which they engage (Jordan and Cairney, 
2013). For example, civil servants seek information from groups. Or, they seek legitimacy for 
their policies through group ‘ownership’. Groups use their resources - based on what they 
provide (expertise, advice, research) and/ or who they represent (a large membership; an 
important profession; a high status donor or corporation) – to secure regular access to 
government.  
In some cases, the relationships between policymakers and pressure participants endure, and 
policy becomes the ‘joint product of their interaction’ (Rose, 1987: 267-8). Consequently, we 
use the term ‘governance’ to describe a messy world in which it is difficult to attribute 
outcomes simply to the decisions of governments (Rhodes, 1997). Jordan et al (2004) also 
use the term ‘pressure participant’ to remind us that ‘lobbying’ to government is not done 
simply by interest groups; the most frequent lobbyists are businesses, public sector 
organisations, and other types of government body at various levels of government.  ‘Multi-
level governance’ captures this messy process involving the blurry boundaries between 
policy produced by elected policymakers and civil servants, and the influence of a wide range 
of governmental, non-governmental and quasi-non-governmental bodies (Bache and Flinders, 
2004). 
When we focus on ideas - a broad term to describe ways of thinking, and the extent to which 
they are shared within groups, organisations, and networks – we identify two main types. The 
first describes the ways of thinking that people accept to such an extent that they are taken for 
granted or rarely challenged (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014). The second is the more intuitive, 
‘I have an idea’, meaning, which refers to the production of new ways of thinking, combined 
with the persuasion necessary to prompt other actors to rethink their beliefs. The policy 
process involves actors competing to raise attention to problems and propose their favoured 
solutions. Not everyone has the same opportunity. Some can exploit a dominant 
understanding of the policy problem, while others have to work harder to challenge existing 
beliefs. A focus on ideas is a focus on power: to persuade the public, media and/ or 
government that there is a reason to make policy; and, to keep some issues on the agenda at 
the expense of others (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Cairney, 2012a: 62). 
‘Context’ describes a policymaker’s environment. It includes the policy conditions that 
policymakers take into account when identifying problems, such as a political system’s 
geography, demographic profile, economy, and mass behaviour (Cairney and Heikkila, 
2014).  It can refer to a sense of policymaker ‘inheritance’ - of laws, rules, and programs – 
when they enter office (Rose, 1990). Or, we may identify events, either routine, such as 
elections, or unanticipated, including social or natural crises or major scientific breakthroughs 
and technological change (Weible 2014). In each case, we consider if a policymaker’s 
environment is in her control and how it influences her decisions. In some cases, the role of 
context seems irresistible – examples include major demographic change, the role of 
technology in driving healthcare demand, climate change, extreme events, and ‘globalisation’ 
(Cairney, 2012a: 113-4). Yet, governments have shown that they can ignore such issues for 
long periods of time.  
Complex policymaking systems 
Each of these five elements could contribute to a sense of complexity. When combined, they 
suggest that the world of policymaking is too complex to predict or fully understand. They 
expose slogans such as ‘joined up’ or ‘holistic’ government as attempts to give a sense of 
order to policymaking, in the face of cross-cutting or ‘wicked’ issues, when we know that 
policymakers can only pay attention to a small portion of the issues for which they are 
responsible.  
We can go one step further to describe government as a complex system. Complexity theory 
explains outcomes in terms of the ‘whole’ policymaking system, ‘greater than the sum of its 
parts’. It identifies, in policymaking systems, the same properties found in complex systems 
in the natural and social world, including: ‘non-linear dynamics’ when some forms of action 
are amplified and others dampened, by positive and negative feedback; ‘sensitivity to initial 
conditions’, or the cumulative effect of early decisions and events; ‘strange attractors’ or 
regularities of behaviour despite the unpredictability of complex systems; and, ‘emergence’ 
(Cairney 2012b: 124-5; Geyer and Rihani, 2010).  
Many of these concepts can be linked to established policy concepts. For example, non-linear 
dynamics are caused partly by bounded rationality and the tendency of policymakers to 
ignore most issues and promote a few to the top of their agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009). Sensitivity to initial conditions is the focus of historical institutionalism, which traces 
current institutions to the cumulative effects of decisions made in the past (Pierson 2000). 
‘Emergence’ refers to the systemic outcomes of interactions between people based on local 
rules, in the absence of central control (Cairney and Geyer, 2015). This may require some 
translation when we consider political systems. Although there is a well-established literature 
on ‘bottom up’ implementation (from Lipsky, 1980, Barrett and Fudge, 1981, and Hjern, 
1982; see also Hill and Hupe, 2008; Nilsen et al, 2013), and central government does not 
control local policy delivery in an absolute sense, few of us would reject its role and 
influence on local outcomes entirely.   
Complex government as a challenge for policymakers 
‘Complex government’ can be used to reject the ‘Westminster model’ - which describes the 
concentration of power in the hands of a small number of people in central government - or a 
‘British political tradition’ based on a top-down, ‘government knows best’ approach 
(Blunkett and Richards, 2011). Complexity theory invites us to consider a more realistic 
policymaking philosophy, and strategies including: relying less on centrally driven targets, 
and punitive performance management, in favour of giving local bodies more freedom to 
adapt to their environment; trial-and-error projects, that can provide lessons and be adopted 
or rejected quickly; and, to teach policymakers about complexity so that they are less 
surprised when things go wrong (Geyer, 2012; Cairney, 2012b; Room, 2011; Hallsworth and 
Rutter 2011).  
Yet, there is a profoundly important tension between the reality of complex government and 
the assertion of government control and accountability. For example, UK policymakers have 
to justify their activities with regard to the Westminster model’s narrative of accountability to 
the public via ministers and Parliament (Rhodes, 2013: 486). We expect ministers to deliver 
on their promises, and few are brave enough to admit their limitations (until they leave 
government). Civil servants also receive training to encourage them to use management 
techniques to exert control over their policymaking tasks (Cairney, 2014a). Squaring this 
circle is not easy.  
Sanderson (2009) suggests that important strides have been made by the Scottish 
Government, which sets a broad national strategy, invites local bodies to produce policies 
consistent with it, and measures performance using broad, long term outcomes.  This is 
consistent with a Scottish system designed to contrast with Westminster culture, but 
important tensions still remain about the government’s dual aim to encourage discretion and 
produce nationwide aims (Cairney and St Denny, 2014). We can also identify tensions (in 
case studies) in countries such as the US, where policymakers present an image of strong 
performance management, partly to mask their frustrations with key organisations and a lack 
of implementation success (Radin, 2006; Honig, 2006). 
Complex government as a challenge for participants and reformers 
Most pressure participants have the same choice when seeking to engage with complex 
government: to bemoan and seek to reform, or to be pragmatic and adapt. This is a feature of 
the interest group world, in which we identify a tendency for groups to follow the action 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2006), often maintaining multi-level lobbying strategies, either 
directly or as part of networks (although the willingness and ability of groups to do so varies 
markedly - Keating et al, 2009; Keating and Wilson, 2014; Cairney, 2009). 
In contrast, we can identify in some scientific circles a naïve attachment to the ideal of 
‘evidence based policymaking’ in which we should seek to minimise the gap between the 
evidence-based identification of a problem and a proportionate government response 
(Cairney and Studlar, 2014). This idea relies on a concentration of power at the centre, and a 
direct link between scientists and elected policymakers. ‘Complex government’ prompts 
scientists to be pragmatic. First, they might adapt their strategy to help produce the 
dissemination of evidence throughout a messy policy process (such as by working with local 
governments, public bodies and stakeholders to ‘co-produce’ meaningful measures of 
effective interventions in particular areas). Second, they may recognise that policy-relevant 
knowledge is not just about the evidence of a problem; it also requires knowledge of how the 
policy process works and how any solution will fare (Cairney, 2014b).  
Complex government also prompts us to consider how we can hold policymakers to account 
if the vast majority of the population does not understand how the policy process works; if 
policy outcomes seem to emerge in unpredictable or uncontrollable ways, or the allegation of 
complexity is used to undermine popular participation or obscure accountability (Bartley and 
Davies, in correspondence, 2014). The aim of political reformers, to go beyond representative 
government and produce more participatory forms of democracy, may solve a general sense 
of detachment by the political class, but it will not necessarily increase the transparency, and 
a popular understanding, of government.  
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